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Introduction
Negotiations often take place in long-term relationships where surpluses sequentially arrive over time.
Some examples of such situations are …rm-worker bargaining in models where labor is not perfectly mobile and bargaining between upstream and downstream …rms when there is a long-term relationship between the two …rms. This problem has also received attention in the literature. Muthoo (1995) analyzes a model where players bargain over a sequence of surpluses and where the arrival of future surpluses depends on the time of agreement. Also, the papers by Felli and Harris (1996) and Leach (1997) analyze models where the sequence of bargaining situations are interdependent. More recently, Hall and Milgrom (2008) analyzed a bargaining model with both a probability of breakdown and con ‡icts, following the lines of Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) . There is also an extensive macro literature on repeated wage bargaining; see e.g., Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2011) .
In this paper, we analyze a bargaining model when there is a long-term relationship between a buyer and a seller and when there is bargaining over a sequence of surpluses. We analyze Markov Perfect Equilibria and characterize the equilibrium payo¤s.
In the model, a seller and buyer are locked into a long-term relationship. Surpluses arrive sequentially at given points in time. When a surplus arrives, the seller and buyer bargain over the surplus for a …xed number of rounds, whereafter the surplus vanishes. Initially, when the surplus arrives, either the buyer or seller is randomly selected to be the proposer. If the proposal is accepted, the surplus is divided according to the proposal and if the proposal is rejected, play either moves to the next round or breaks down. If play moves to the next round, players get disagreement payo¤s that are di¤erent from the breakdown payo¤s.
In the next round, a proposer is randomly selected to make a proposal and so on. Bargaining over the surplus thus proceeds for a given number of rounds until the surplus is forfeited after the …nal round. A new surplus arrives and then bargaining over the surplus starts anew. The model generalizes the credible bargaining framework in Hall and Milgrom (2008) that also allows for both a probability of breakdown during negotiations and an outside option based on the payo¤s under disagreement. In addition we allow for an arbitrary number of bargaining rounds in each time period and a more general payo¤ structure.
We …nd conditions for the existence and uniqueness of immediate-agreement equilibrium.
We analyze the equilibrium payo¤s and …nd that the payments between the players can be described as a …rst-order system of di¤erence equations. The solution of this system is described as the number of rounds goes to in…nity and equilibrium payo¤s can be described in terms of (initial round) current surpluses and future values in the game besides payo¤s in terms of disagreement and breakdown. Speci…cally, note 2 that the transfers between the seller and the buyer depend both on current and future surpluses, despite the fact that parties only bargain over current surpluses; as soon as a new surplus arrive, bargaining over that surplus starts anew. This is partly because bargaining under a risk of breakdown entails the risk of losing both current ant future surpluses and partly because delay without separation can last until a new surplus arrives, which means that future surpluses a¤ect the current bargaining outcome.
The model in this paper is di¤erent from the model in Muthoo (1995) , where the time of arrival of future surpluses is dependent on the time of agreement. Nevertheless, the payo¤ is dependent on the expected value in future agreements. As in Muthoo (1995) , the division of surplus is di¤erent from the division of the surplus in a standard bargaining game, see for example Rubinstein (1982) , although for other reasons than in Muthoo (1995) .
The bargaining model is introduced in section 2. Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium and …nally section 4 concludes the paper.
The model
There are two parties i 2 N = fb; sg bargaining over a sequence of values fv t g 1 0 where v t = fv b t ; v s t g 2 R 2 is the value that arrives in time period t. In a given time period t, the parties bargain over how to share the surplus. Bargaining in period t over v t takes place in R rounds; a round lasts for = 1 R units of time. If an agreement is reached between the parties on some payo¤ division, the distribution is implemented in round r in period t. If no agreement is reached before or in round R the surplus is forfeit. During bargaining, the parties separate exogenously with probability when a proposal is rejected. Parties discount future values by the discount factor per time period. Thus, the value in period t of receiving a unit of goods in period t 0 > t is t 0 t . In each round, the proposer is randomly selected with probability p s t for the seller and p b t for the buyer. A strategy in the game for player i is denoted i . Let = ( i ) i2N and let denote the set of strategy pro…les. In general, the strategy at any round in time period t is a function the history up to that round.
Payo¤s are potentially nonlinearly dependent on v t . Let r t (v s t ) denote the current (net transfer) payo¤ of the seller in round r and time period t if agreement is reached in that round and time period.
Similarly, let r t v b t denote the current (net transfer) payo¤ of the buyer in round r and time period t. As an example, suppose a …rm is bargaining with a worker over a …xed labor input of the worker that is used in the production of a good that the …rm sells. r t is then the utility cost of supplying labor for the worker and (1) and the continuation payo¤ of the buyer is
where h 0 t+1 = fh r t ; W r t ; Ag. The model is a generalization of Hall and Milgrom (2008) , both because we allow for R > 1 rounds and for a more general payo¤ structure. Thus, let U t denote the value for the seller when there is a breakdown in bargaining. For the buyer, the value in case of a breakdown is normalized to zero. If an agreement is not reached in a bargaining round r, the seller receivesẑ t and the buyer t in the round. We assumeẑ t > 0 and^ t > 0. The di¤erence between this model and the model in Muthoo (1995) is that surpluses arrive at …xed points in time in this paper while they arrive at a …xed time after an agreement in Muthoo (1995) . Moreover, proposers are selected at random in this paper instead of sequentially.
In the paper, we focus on Markov strategies. A Markov strategy depends on r, t and the payo¤ relevant variables. A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is a SPE in Markov strategies (MPE). For a formal treatment, see Maskin and Tirole (2001) .
Equilibrium
By standard arguments, in any MPE where an o¤er is accepted with positive probability, when being selected as proposer, the proposer o¤ers the respondent a transfer such that the respondent is indi¤erent 4 between accepting and rejecting. Let W r;s t denote a proposal by the seller and let W r;b t denote a proposal by the buyer in round r. De…ne = 1 R and let = . For now, we restrict attention to equilibria where an agreement is reached; below we describe conditions for existence and uniqueness. Then, as long as r < R, in any equilibrium prescribing an agreement, the buyer o¤ers the seller W r;b t such that
where h 0 t+1 , h 00 t+1 and h 000 t+1 are identical up to period t and before round r. Following round r in period t, h 0 t+1 prescribes acceptance of W 
and similarly for the seller. Then, as long as r < R, the seller o¤ers the buyer W r;s t such that
When r = R, the values are
and
Before proving the main result, the following example illustrates that transfers in a given period t depend on e.g., surpluses in all time periods following t.
Example 1 A simple example with two time periods and one round in each time period. Proposer prob-abilities are 1 2 , = 1 and 1 t = 0 for t = f1; 2g, U t = U ,ẑ 1 =ẑ 2 =ẑ,^ 1 =^ 2 =^ , for t = f1; 2g and
In the last round, we have
Then the continuation payo¤ s at the beginning of period 2 can be written as, using = 1,
In the …rst time period transfers are, using (5) and (6),
Clearly, the wage W Note that the transfers between the seller and the buyer depend both on current and future surpluses, despite the fact that parties start to bargain as soon as a new surplus arrives, as long as breakdown probability is less than one. This is partly because a breakdown of negotiations risks losing both current and future surpluses, in turn having the implication that future surpluses a¤ect the current bargaining outcome, and partly because delay without separation might last until future surpluses arrive.
We can rearrange the equilibrium conditions for making an acceptable proposal (3) and (4) in any round r < R so that the transfers between the seller and the buyer can be characterized by two di¤erence equations. Thus, we have, for r R 1,
where
6 and
This follows easily by rearranging expressions (3) and (4). Intuitively, the current transfers are equal to a combination of a current round payo¤s, as given by B r t , plus a probability-weighted average of the transfers in the next round, modi…ed by discounting and the probability of breakdown. Note that A t is idempotent.
Moreover, the equilibrium conditions (5) and (6) for making an acceptable proposal in the last round of period t, i.e., when a rejection leads to complete forfeit of the surplus in period t and continued bargaining in period t + 1, can be rewritten as
By repeatedly using expressions (10) -(12) and expressions (13) -(14) in a MPE with immediate agreement, the solution for the transfers between the seller and the buyer is given by
and 0
The following Lemma describes the transfers as a …rst-order di¤erence equation.
Lemma 1
The transfers between the seller and the buyer are given by the following di¤ erence equation:
(1 )
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The following example shows that uniqueness of an immediate agreement equilibrium cannot be guaranteed.
Example 2 An example with two time periods and one round in each time period (i.e., = 1). Proposer probabilities are 1 2 , = 1,ẑ t =^ t = 0 and 1;t = 0 for t = f1; 2g, U 1 = 1 2 + and 1 2 > U 2 . In the last round, equilibrium prescribes agreement and we have
Then the continuation payo¤ s at the beginning of period 2 can be written as
Consider a candidate equilibrium where unacceptable o¤ ers are made in period 1. Then payo¤ s in period
(20)
If the buyer deviates and makes an acceptable o¤ erŴ = W 1;b 1 + " for some " > 0, the wage has to satisfy
Then the gain from making an acceptable o¤ er is, using that
The above expression is violated if
Since an identical condition can be established if the seller deviates and makes an acceptable o¤ er, there is an equilibrium with zero probability of agreement in period 1 if is large enough. Note that the above expression implies
To ensure existence, we impose the following conditions on payo¤s.
Condition 1 For all t and r < R, Condition 2 For all r; t we have
The …rst condition requires that there is a surplus in agreeing rather than disagreeing and remaining in the relationship and the second that there is a surplus in disagreeing rather than separating.
Proposition 1 If conditions 1 and 2 are satis…ed, an immediate agreement MPE exists for any 1.
Proof : See the appendix.
To show uniqueness we restrict attention to convergent sequences of U t ,ẑ t and^ t . Let
We restrict the limits of the inside and outside options in the following way.
Condition 3 U , z and satis…es
Proposition 2 If conditions 1, 2 and 3 are satis…ed, then there is a such that, for any > , 1 the immediate agreement MPE is unique for any <^ .
. If the yearly discount rate is 4%, the condition is satis…ed if surpluses arrive in intervals of up to almost 25 years.
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Due to conditions 1 and 2, the only reason for delaying is that the value of breakdown in the future is larger than remaining in the relationship. Given the fairly mild condition 3, the proposition rules out the case with delayed agreement. 2 Equilibrium transfers as ! 0 can be found by repeatedly using expressions (15) -)16), together with the following continuity and boundedness conditions.
Condition 4 For all r; t such that r < R 1 we have
Furthermore, lim !0 R t = 0 and lim !0
Condition 5 The sequence of surpluses f 1 t g 1 t=1 and f
Thus, the surpluses grow slower than breakdown-adjusted discounting, ensuring that the total discounted value when bargaining is …nite.
The equilibrium transfers are given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose conditions 4 and 5 are satis…ed. In a MPE with immediate agreement, the solution to the system of di¤ erence equations (15) and (16) when ! 0 is given by
2 If the sequences are not convergent, there is a unique equilibrium if condition 3 is modi…ed to ln lim inf
Ut where 
where, for r < R,
and for r = R,
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Using expressions (15) - (16) we then have
If the sequences f 1 t g 1 t=1 and f 1 t g 1 t=1 satisfy condition 5, we have
Hence the …rst term in expression (34) goes to zero ast ! 1. Moreover, noting that B r t = B r t + D r t gives 0
Note that, by the de…nition of A t+i , the only terms that are di¤erent in W 
Step 2. Computing B t+i and D t+i .
De…ne
Then, using the de…nition of R and B r t+i ,
Letting
and using that
and the properties of A t+i , i.e., we have A t+j A t+i = A t+i , we can establish (27) in the proposition. To establish (28), let
and note that D t+i can be written as
a telescoping series and hence, using that lim R!1 D 1 t+i = 0, that A t+j A t+i = A t+i and de…ning
we can establish (28).
The proof divides up the round payo¤ in (12) in terms of ‡ow round payo¤s in expression (27) and surplus changes between rounds in (28). Speci…cally, even if transfers in (15) depend on the surpluses in all rounds in the current period through B r t , the resulting wage depends only on the surplus in the …rst round in each time period. From a technical perspective, this is because the payo¤s in expression (17) depend on the change in surpluses between rounds implying that surpluses for higher rounds enter payo¤s in a telescoping way and hence cancel themselves out, leading to that transfers depend only on …rst-period surplus. Note also that, since agreement is reached in the …rst round, total payo¤s depend only on …rst-period surplus. Thus, we can express the equilibrium payo¤s partly in terms of future disagreement and separation payo¤s, i.e., U t+i ,ẑ t+i and^ t+i , and partly in terms of future values of the problem, besides depending on current …rst round surplus.
Remark 1 Note that expression (17) in Lemma 1 can be written as
Generally these expressions are somewhat complicated. However, in the special case when the probability of breakdown vanishes (i.e., ! 0), equilibrium payo¤s have a simpler and more intuitive form.
Remark 2 Note that, if there is no discounting between rounds in a given time period, but rather only between time periods, the results above hold with minor modi…cations of conditions and results. Equation 
Equations (4), (5) and (6) (12) is
which is re ‡ected in the construction of B r t and D r t in the proof. In the statement of the proposition, expression (27) when ! 0 is modi…ed to
Furthermore, we can write
As ! 0 then lim !0 1 e = 1 and hence
Thus, the value of agreeing is equal to the disagreement value (the right-hand side terms on the …rst row) plus the seller proposer probability (1 p b t ) times the surplus of agreeing plus the future wage (capturing future surpluses). When the probability of breakdown parameter goes to in…nity, equilibrium payo¤ s depend only on the separation payo¤ s and not onẑ t and^ t , besides current and future values. Too see this, note that, as ! 1, we get
Since lim !1 1 e ! 0, we thus get
implying that the payo¤ of agreeing is
i.e., the separation outside option plus the proposal probability times the total value of agreeing. Note that the above expression di¤ ers from (45) in that the current payo¤ of agreeing for the seller depends on the outside option U t .
Concluding remarks
In the paper we analyze a bargaining model when there is a long-term relationship between a seller and a buyer and bargaining over a sequence of surpluses arriving at …xed points in time. Markov Perfect Equilibria are analyzed and the equilibrium payo¤s characterized. We …nd conditions for uniqueness and existence of an immediate-agreement equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that the transfers between the players can be described as a …rst-order system of di¤erence equations in terms of current and future transfers.
We …nd that the transfers between the seller and the buyer depend both on current and future surpluses, despite the fact that parties starts to bargain as soon as a new surplus arrives, as long as breakdown probability is positive. This is not only because bargaining under a risk of breakdown risks losing the surplus both today and in the future, but also because delay without separation might last until the arrival of future surpluses, which in turn means that future surpluses a¤ect the current bargaining outcome.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose the buyer is the proposer. The seller case follows by a similar argument.
Case 1. Suppose r < R. The wage when making an acceptable o¤er is
and when making an unacceptable o¤er
The gain of making an acceptable o¤er is then r t
(1 ) (1 )
Using conditions (1), (2) and that
we establish that there exists a such that
Case 2. Suppose r = R. The gain of making an acceptable o¤er is
From (16) we have
and hence (60) can be rewritten as
By similar arguments as in Case 1 there is a~ such that the expression above is positive, for all 1.
Combining case 1 and 2 and letting = minf ;~ g we establish existence for any 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose the buyer is the proposer. The seller case follows by a similar argument.
We …rst show that, if it is pro…table to make an acceptable o¤er in round r in period t, then it is pro…table to make an acceptable o¤er in period t 1.
Suppose the MPE has a buyer proposal accepted in round r R for some t. Consider round r 1 and suppose the buyer proposesŴ such that i for some " > 0. Clearly, the seller accepts this o¤er with probability one for any " > 0. 
condition 1, 2 and 3 establishes that, for " small, there exists a such that expression (65) is positive for < whenever > 1 e . Suppose the buyer proposal is not accepted in any round. Consider round R and suppose the buyer proposesŴ such that 
The seller accepts this o¤er with probability one as long as " > 0. The payo¤ when an unacceptable o¤er 20 is made is
and hence the gain is R t + R t
(1 ) (ẑ t +^ t ) +
Again, for " small, there exists a such that expression (65) is positive for < whenever > 1 e . Combining case 1 and 2 and letting^ = minf ; g we establish uniqueness for any <^ whenever 
